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INTRODUCTION
Despite the comfortable notion that modern man has attained a
certain degree of civilization, recent history continues to furnish
frequent examples of man's inhumanity to his fellow man. Interna-
tional lawyers have responded to this tragic inconsistency be-
tween "civilization" and the deeds of "civilized" men by recon-
sidering the classic customary law doctrine(s) of humanitarian in-
tervention with a view to legitimating intervention by state ac-
tors in the territory of other states wherein gross violations of
human rights are seen to occur. Such a reconsideration of a body
of law which antedates the Charter of the United Nations and, as
will be demonstrated, conflicts with it, makes apparent not only a
deep concern for human rights values but also chronic frustration
created by the self-enforcing character of international legal
norms, a situation dictated by a world order firmly rooted in the
nation-state paradigm.
This article is an examination of the current legal validity of the
case for humanitarian intervention, in the context of international
law as presently constituted under the Charter of the United Na-
tions and as exemplified by the practice of states invoking the doc-
trine in one form or another. Early in the analysis some attention
is paid to the genesis of the competing legal norms involved and
concluding arguments are offered by way of both empirical obser-
vation and normative assessment of the problems thus raised.
* This article is a revised version of a paper originally prepared for the graduate semi-
nar on International Protection of Human Rights at the New York University School of
Law. The author wishes to thank Professor Thomas M. Franck and Professor Theodor
Meron at New York University, and Professor Roger Fisher at Harvard Law School, and
Mr. T. Rothermel of the United Nations Development Program, New York City. Errors and
omissions are those of the writer alone.
** LL.M. Candidate, Harvard Law School; B.A. 1974, LL.B. 1977, Queen's University at
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I. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: DEFINITION AND
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
The term intervention, both in a general sense and in the more
particular sense contemplated here, only has meaning in the con-
text of relations between states. In this context, the starting point
for an analysis of intervention by states in the affairs of other
states is an appreciation of the doctrine of nonintervention,' a no-
tion basic to the fundamental principle of the sovereign equality of
states.!
The importance of this symbiotic relationship cannot be over-
emphasized. Professor Falk has reiterated that "[n]onintervention
is a doctrinal mechanism to express the outer limits of permissible
influence that one State may exert upon another . . ."I but it ap-
pears equally clear that the doctrine of nonintervention and the
notion of state sovereignty are but two branches of the same tree.
Under the contemporary international law of the United Nations,
it may be said that this doctrine is functionally equivalent to the
principle of domestic jurisdiction contained in Article 2,
paragraph 7 of the Charter.'
' Some confusion arises as to whether the doctrine of nonintervention exists subject to
certain exceptions where intervention may be justified, inter alia, on humanitarian
grounds, or whether the exceptions themselves explain the scope of the doctrine. The
Thomases have pointedly observed that "... . the majority of publicists do not refer to non-
intervention, the negative form, but discuss the doctrine of intervention and its juridical or
political nature -admitting, however, that non-intervention is the rule by which states
should conduct themselves, but stating that intervention is the exception. Non-intervention,
then, is a restriction or limitation on intervention; and actually the interest in non-interven-
tion arises from or has as its source those interventions which are carried on by states
against other states in practice, and which either openly violate the rule of non-intervention
or, according to some publicists, are legal or justifiable interventions- hence exceptions to
the rule of non-intervention." A. THOMAS and A.J. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION: THE
LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 67 (1956) [hereinafter cited as NON-INTERVENTION].
These observations have been subsequently borne out in the reverse approach taken by R.
VINCENT. NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 3-16 (1974).
' "The rule of nonintervention can be said to derive from and require respect for the
principle of state sovereignty.
Sovereignty can be a statement expressing the idea that 'there is a final and absolute
political authority in the political community' and that 'no final and absolute authority ex-
ists elsewhere.' Where such final and absolute authorities are collected together in interna-
tional society, it can be said that the recognition by each of them of the other's authority
within their own domains-recognition of a principle of state sovereignty-is fundamental
to their coexistence." VINCENT, supra note 1 at 14, citing F. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 26 (1966).
' "This is a fundamental conception in a decentralized legal order in which outer limits
cannot be adjusted by central impartial institutions." Falk, The United States and the
Doctrine of Nonintervention in the Internal Affairs of Independent States, 5 How. L.J.
163, 165 (1959) (original italics); R. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD 159 (1968).
' "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to in-
tervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state ..
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Prior to the era of the Charter of the United Nations, the Per-
manent Court of International Justice had neatly summarized the
essential thrust of the foregoing discussion.
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international
law on a State is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule
to the contrary-it may not exercise its power in any form in
the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is cer-
tainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its
territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from in-
ternational custom or from a convention.'
Thus, any theory of humanitarian intervention must offer a legiti-
mate exception from this stated norm in contemporary interna-
tional law.
. Humanitarian intervention is a particular species of an excep-
tion to a rule; it is possible to look further into the character of the
particular exception relevant to the present inquiry, in order to
appropriately narrow its scope. Intervention by one state in the
affairs of another state can and does take many forms-military,
economic, diplomatic, social and cultural -but it is intervention in
the strongest form (short of war),' meaning "dictatorial inter-
ference in the sense of action amounting to a denial of the indepen-
dence of the State,"' which has dominated analyses of the legiti-
macy of humanitarian intervention both under general interna-
tional law and especially in the post-1945 era of the Charter of the
United Nations. Thus, the application of'the use or threat of force
by one state in the territory of another state has become basic to
the analysis of the subject of humanitarian intervention. That
assumption is reflected in the analysis presented in this article."
the sole exception being collective action pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter. The
observation is Falk's, supra note 3, 5 How. L.J. 163, 165 (1959).
' The S.S. Lotus (1927) P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 9, 18-19.
' "The nonintervention principle (and its concomitant exceptions) applied in the regime of
peace. In the regime of war the law made no such demand of states, seeking to regulate
only the conduct of war and not its incidence ...." VINCENT, supra note 1, at 293; see also
THOMAS AND THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 73.
' L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 134, at 305 (8th ed. 1955), H. LAUTERPACHT, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (1950); applied by Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by
States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 330 (1967). See also H. KELSEN, PRIN-
CIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (1952), quote continues as "for the right to undertake war
remained a sovereign prerogative." THOMAS AND THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION, supra note 1,
at 68. Such definitional terminology as "dictatorial interference" and "coercive" (id. at 72) in
itself creates further definitional problems. See VINCENT, supra note 1, at 7-8. Nevertheless,
it serves well enough to demonstrate the basic form of state-action herein considered.
' "The essence of intervention is force, or the threat of force, in case the dictates of in-
tervening power are disregarded ... There can be no intervention without on the one hand,
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It may now be stated that, for the purpose of this discussion,
"[humanitarian] intervention occurs when a state or group of states
interferes, [by the use of force] in order to impose its will, in the
internal or external affairs of another state, sovereign and in-
dependent, with which peaceful relations exist and without its
consent, for the purpose of maintaining or altering the conditions
of things [when the intervening state finds that the condition or its
removal is contrary to the laws of humanity]."9 Since this postulate
clearly contravenes the fundamental principle of state sovereignty,
the definition must presuppose the exhaustion of available alter-
natives. Thus, it conforms to the principle that special circum-
stances "legitimate" the normally illegitimate."0
Traditional international law distinguishes between two cate-
gories of intervention related to humanitarian considerations: the
protection of nationals and their property abroad by the interven-
ing state; and humanitarian intervention per se, where the basis
for intervention is not the link of nationality between the persons
sought to be protected and the intervening state, but the protec-
tion of individuals or groups of individuals from their own state or
within the territory of a state where the governing authority per-
mits gross abuses of human rights or itself maltreats its subjects
in a manner which shocks the conscience of mankind."
the presence of force, naked or veiled, and on the other hand, the absence of consent on the
part of the combatants." T. LAWRENCE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (5th ed.
1913); Kelsen elaborates the notiontof "dictatorial" to imply the threat or use of force, supra
note 7, at 64; The Thomases, while acceding to the basic point, remonstrate that "the type of
constraint or compulsion used by the intervening state is of little importance. The impor-
tant point to be considered is whether constraint or threat thereof was used, whether by
armed force or by diplomacy, whether concealed or open, whether direct or indirect.
Therefore, interference to be intervention must constitute compulsion or threat thereof.
And 'threat' is to be understood to mean that there is a direct or indirect request by one
state that another do or refrain from doing something upon pain of compulsion." NON-INTER-
VENTION. supra note 1, at 69. More recently, Professor Thomas Franck has offered the
following definition: "The theory of intervention on the ground of humanity is properly that
which recognizes the right of one state to exercise an international control by military force
over the acts of another in regard to its internal sovereignty when contrary to the laws of
humanity." Franck and Rodley, After Bangla Desh: The Law of Humanitarian Inter-
vention By Military Force, 67 A.J.I.L. 275, 277 n. 12 (1973). That definition has been
adopted from Rougier, La Theorie de l'Intervention d'Humanite, 17 REV. GEN. DU DROIT
INT'L 468 (1910). Although it is admitted that coercion may take various forms, the use of
force or threat thereof remains conspicuous in the practice of states wherever and
whenever humanitarian intervention has been invoked.
' This definition of humanitarian intervention is adapted from THOMAS AND THOMAS, who
similarly defined intervention generally in NON-INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 71.
, Id. at 78.
11 Cf. OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 312. "But there is a substantial body of opinion and of
practice in support of the view that when a State renders itself guilty of cruelties against
and persecution of its nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights
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Both species of intervention evolved from Western European
concepts developed during the nineteenth century. The legal im-
petus for protecting nationals abroad was prompted by the desire
of "civilized" nations to guarantee certain minimum standards
with regard to life, liberty and property to their citizens wherever
they might be found and by whatever means necessary for the
task.12 The implied corollary was that nations professing such
minimum standards had the power requisite for their enforcement
against and within the territory of allegedly less civilized neigh-
bours. 3 Hence, it has been asserted accurately that the legal justi-
fication for the protection of nationals abroad was a direct product
of nineteenth century imperialism14 and the practical exigencies of
subjugating far away lands.
It is only fair to recognize that, since imperialism is a pejorative
word to modern ears, the origins of the legal framework for the
protection of nationals should be distinguished from its normative
value once established. 5 However, it must also be admitted that
the genesis of legality for a particular rule of conduct-especially
a permissive rule in derogation of a more pervasive legal norm-is
attributable to and, at least to some extent, dependent upon the
particular world view existing at the time of its incorporation into
the international legal system. It follows that the validity of the
rule need not be sustained necessarily by succeeding world views
and to shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is legally
permissible."
11 The means ranged from mere diplomatic protest to the use of military force. See E.
BORCHARD. THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 448-451 (1915); OPPENHEIM,
supra note 7, at 309.
"S "The protection of citizens in a foreign country naturally involves the establishment
and enforcement of some degree of law and order in that community. When order is
neglected )', or is impossible for the foreign government, then the more advanced state
has a rigs t to intervene for the protection of the life and property of its citizens." H.
HODGES, THE DOCTRINE OF INTERVENTION 58-59 (1915).
" The point is made rather strongly by Professor Falk, who refers to the "colonial
system of domination and exploitation" in Historical Tendencies, Modernizing and Revolu-
tionary Nations and the International Legal Order, 8 How. L.J. 128, 135-136 (1962).
Moreover, "a striking degree of correspondence between the economic or political interests
of certain large countries and the course of action followed by their governments on ques-
tions of protection can scarcely be denied" thus fitting the "imperialist" hypothesis. F.
DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS 22-24 (1932).
"S Professor Lillich argues that "[w]hile it is true that 'the ideas of justice and fair dealing
incorporated in the accepted norms of conduct for European nations were carried over into
the wider sphere of the international society of the nineteenth century,' there is no need to
apologize for attempting to establish a universal consensus behind justice and fair dealing."
Self-Help, supra note 7, at 327-28; but see Franck and Rodley, After Bangla Desh, supra note
8, at 277, who are of the opinion that "[tihere are few more reactionary ideas ever to have
sought the imprimatur of 'international law."'
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
subject to shifts in power in the relations between states,
although that might be the case.16
Initially, the right to intervene for the protection of nationals
was accepted without question-at least by those states inclined
to exercise it. This principle of "forcible self-help" was upheld
almost without qualification by international treaty in the second
Hague Convention of 1907,17 and it was distinguished from the con-
cept of intervention per se, which was somehow limited to "only
those forceful coercive measures designed to maintain or alter the
political situation in another state."18 Therefore, since the focus of
intervention had nothing to do with the political independence of
the target state, but instead involved the lives and property of na-
tionals within its territory, it was argued that self-help in such a
context was not intervention but "non-belligerent interposition."' 9
In any event, the practical result of applying this principle was
the paradox that "the individual in his capacity as an alien enjoys
a larger measure of protection by international law than in his
character as the citizen of his own State. '
Humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, was justified by
its nineteenth century as well as subsequent proponents as "an in-
stance of intervention for the purpose of vindicating the law of na-
tions against outrage"21 without regard to the nationality of the
16 The breakdown of imperialism in all its forms, the passing of colonialism and the
emergence of the so-called Third World as a new locus of political power exemplifies a
radically altered world view since 1945. In respect of this phenomenon, Professor Falk has
remarked that "[t]he use of diplomatic protection as a means to impose the external will of
richer and more powerful nations inspired a hostile reaction on the part of capital-importing
nations that were often the victims of such conduct. Non-colonial forms of imperialism
relied rather heavily upon rules of international law to retain economic dominance, especially
the rules and practices that allowed a nation to protect its nationals .... These rules were
satisfactory so long as the capital-exporting nations possessed control over the character of
international relations. However, it is obvious that insofar as international law developed to
promote the interests of capital-exporting nations, it will not serve the interests of a world
community where capital export is no longer coincident with political power." Falk, supra
note 14, at 133.
17 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 18 October 1907, 100
BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 298. The sole exception to application of the principle
of forcible self-help was in respect of the recovery of contract debts. Convention respecting
the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts, 18 October
1907, 100 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 314.
"S Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, at 330.
is BORCHARD, supra note 12, at 448; see also C. HYDE. INTERNATIONAL LAW 246 (2d ed.
1951).
20 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 7, at 121.
'1 "For it is a basic principle of every human society and the law which governs it that no
member may persist in conduct which is considered to violate the universally recognized
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victims of such vile behavior. In essence, the doctrine hinged on
the concept of a threshold or minimum standard for the treatment
of individuals within a state and for which the state was held
responsible. Where the standard was violated it constituted an
abuse of the sovereign rights of the offending state," and author-
ized intervention on grounds of humanity by other members of
the international community. Hence, these basic considerations
motivated jurists including Grotius, Wheaton, Heiberg, Woolsey,
Bluntschli and Westlake to document the legality of such a con-
cept."3
The practice of states invoking human rights justifications ante-
cedent to or in the wake of violations of neighbouring sovereign-
ties is better understood in light of the foregoing distinction.
This observation applies to precedents both prior and subse-
quent to the promulgation of the United Nations Charter in
1945, since the traditional categories of humanitarian intervention
have been typically employed either in conjunction with or in con-
tradistinction to principles set forth in the Charter. However,
with respect to the use of force by states for humanitarian ends, it
is submitted that the utility of the two-fold classification of
customary international law collapses for the purpose of assessing
the legal propriety of humanitarian intervention in the post-1945
era entered at the conclusion of the San Francisco Conference.2 5
With the possible exception of analogies to the inherent right of
self-defense enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter, 6 it would ap-
pear that the identity of nationality between the objects of inter-
vention (those persons who are threatened) and the intervening
state sheds little light on the legitimacy of the use of force by one
state in the territory of another state where the latter is subject
to the prevailing norms exemplified by paragraphs 4 and 7 con-
tained in Article 2 of the Charter.' Consequently, a consideration
principles of decency and humanity." E. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
51-52 (1921); LAUTERPACHT, supra note 7, at 32; OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 312.
U THOMAS AND THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 77-78.
,3 Discussed in STOWELL, supra note 21, at 55-62. The determination of legality turned on
"draw[ing] the line between the due exercise of sovereignty which the law of nations
recognizes and the abusive insistence upon independent action without consideration of the
equally important rights of other states and the interests of the commonweal." Id. at 455.
2 See notes 28-38 and text infra.
See generally UNITED NATIONS, DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON IN-
TERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, in 22 vols. (New York, 1946) [hereinafter cited as U.N.C.I.O.].
" See D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-105 (1958).
Although, as a practical matter, given the primacy of national interests and obligations
as distinguished from the perhaps desirable though politically hazardous motivations of
global "good Samaritans," this identity is usually present-at least in some degree- to war-
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of the status ascribed to principles governing the use of force by
states under the Charter will be most helpful in advance of ex-
amining the practice of states in the specific context of humani-
tarian intervention.
I. THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER
Article 1 of the United Nations Charter stated unequivocally
the primary purpose of the new international organization: "[tlo
maintain international peace and security.. ."" The Charter con-
firmed the collective view of the international community that the
use of force was no longer an acceptable or tolerable alternative
for the redress of grievances between sovereign states. Article 2,
paragraph 4 states that "[aill members shall refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force against the ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of any state .... "
The basic principle contained in Article 2, paragraph 4 il-
lustrated a new and formidable emphasis on the sovereign equality
of states within the community of nations.29 Paragraph 7 of Article
2 created a haven for sovereign prerogatives whereby "[n]othing
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state," reserving only to the United
Nations Organization the caveat that "this principle shall not pre-
judice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter
VIi."s01
'rant invocation of a right to intervene on grounds of humanity in the territory of another
state.
" "[B]y the taking of effective collective measures to prevent or remove 'threats to the
peace' and to suppress 'acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.' It has been
pointed out that the insertion of the words 'in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law' encourages the claim that, unless law and justice are served, recourse to
force may not be justified." L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO AND A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 45 (3d rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as GOODRICH].
However, it should be noted that such a claim would apply only to the United Nations
Organization (i.e., the Security Council acting pursuant to the authority conferred under
Chapter VII of the Charter) and not to independent state actors.
The major powers agreed to the inclusion of the phrase "against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state" chiefly "in response to the demand of the smaller
states that there should be some assurance that force would not be used by the more
powerful states at the expense of the weaker ones." GOODRICH, id. at 43; see 6 U.N.C.I.O.
342-46 (1946). For texts of proposals by Honduras, Brazil, Columbia and Australia
underscoring the necessity for such a guarantee, see 3 U.N.C.I.O. 233, 246, 349, 543, 587
(1946).
" The principle of "domestic jurisdiction" has constituted a perennial challenge to the
competence of the United Nations to intervene in the affairs of states in pursuit of achiev-
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The abandonment of the use of force by states as a legally sanc-
tioned political tool in all cases, except those covered by the ex-
press reservation of "the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense" set forth in Article 51 of the Charter,"2 signified a
final renunciation by the members of the United Nations of the
classical dichotomy in customary international law between the
laws of peace and war. This departure was the culmination of con-
siderable effort by leading state actors begun at the conclusion of
the First World War. Thus, Article 2, paragraph 4 was a key
aspect of the international community's response to what was
deficient in Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,33
and in the abortive efforts to stave off the spectre of new world
conflict exemplified by the Treaty of Locarno 4 and the Peace Pact
of Paris."
The drafters of the Charter squarely met the challenge of pro-
viding a more comprehensive restraining rule than the mere pro-
hibition of a "resort to war," which was the approach taken in
ing greater respect for human rights. See Preuss, Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the Charter
of the United Nations and Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction, 74 RECUEIL DES COURS 553
(1949-I). While it has been argued that the General Assembly "only has competence to pro-
mote voluntary cooperation between members" in pursuit of the goals set forth in Articles
55 and 56 of the Charter, that organ "has not accepted this claim and has acted on the
premise that it does have competence to deal with such situations on the ground that
Charter provisions dealing with human rights are being violated." GOODRICH, supra note 28,
at 71; see his commentary on Articles 55 and 56, id at 371-82; R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
118-30 (1963). Moreover, see Article 2, paragraph 7, "the United Nations definitely has the
legal right to use force for humanitarian purposes if the state violating basic human rights
causes an actual threat to the peace." Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15
McGILL L.J. 205, 212 (1969), citing McDougal and Bebr, Human Rights in the United
Nations, 58 A.J.I.L. 603, 612 (1964); THOMAS & THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at
384; see generally Gilmour, The Meaning of 'Intervene' Within Article 2(7) of the United
Nations Charter-An Historical Per.svective, 16 INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 330 (1967).
", For succinct summaries of the classical position, see BOWETT, supra note 26, at 117-20;
I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 1-40 (1963); M. McDOUGAL
& F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 131-38 (1961).
32 See commentary of GOODRICH, supra note 28, at 342-53; BOWETT, supra note 31, at 9-12.
The High Contracting Parties "undertake to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of
the League" and "not to resort to war" (Articles 10 and 11), the unauthorized act of which
constituted "an act of war against all other Members of the League . . ." (Article 16). See
generally A. ZIMMERN. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW, 1918-1935 (1936), F.
WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1952).
' Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, done 16 October 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 289.
"' General Treaty For Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, done 27
August 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57, also known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact after its chief in-
stigators, U.S. Secretary of State Kellogg and the French Foreign Minister Aristide
Briand; see generally H. MILLER, THE PEACE PACT OF PARIS (1928).
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the League Covenant and its inter-war progeny. 6 Subsequently,
the practice of the United Nations, which represents an increas-
ingly larger world family, 7 has reaffirmed the fundamental princi-
ple enunciated by the words contained in paragraph 4 of Article 2.
Moreover, the scope and validity of the principle promptly received
the imprimatur of the International Court of Justice. 8 While a
detailed examination of these elements is beyond the scope of this
inquiry, the following brief discussion of some of the highlights
bears directly on the conclusions to be drawn from the study as a
whole and the central argument advanced in this article.
A. The Quest For A Constraining Definitional Framework
A basic goal which had to be met in order to regulate the use of
force by states was the achievement of a definition for its use suf-
ficiently broad to preclude all uses culpable as acts of aggres-
sion by a state or group of states against another and, there-
fore, contrary to general principles of international law. The
search for a definition of aggression began in earnest following
the establishment of the League of Nations39 and was imbued with
" Article 2 of the Locarno Treaty, supra note 34, provided for the parties' mutual under-
taking "that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each
other,". except in "the exercise of the right of legitimate defense," or by action pursuant to
Article 16 of the Covenant, (or) action taken as a result of a collective decision of either the
Council or the Assembly of the League. Article 1 of the Paris Treaty, supra note 35, pledged
the parties to "condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." On the
Covenant provisions see note 34 supra.
11 Membership in the General Assembly of the United Nations has increased from 55 na-
tions in July of 1947, 1 U.N.Y.B. 1946-47 863-64 (1947) compared with 144 members as of 31
December 1975, 29 U.N.Y.B. 1975 1095 (1978).
"' Corfu Channel Case [1950] I.C.J. REP. 4.
89 In 1923, the Third Committee of the League Assembly submitted a Draft Treaty of
Mutual Assistance, rejecting formal criteria defining aggression in favour of a system of ad
hoc determinations on the basis of proposed guidelines including assessment of the attitude
of the possible aggressor, propaganda and media coverage, L.N.O.J. Spec. Supp. No. 16, An-
nex 10, Pt. 1, at 203-09 (1923); see also the Draft Geneva Protocol initially adopted but later
dropped by the League Assembly, where aggression was defined as a resort to war "in
violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol."
L.N.O.J. Spec. Supp. No. 24, Annex 18, at 136-40 (1934); the Convention for the Definition of
Aggression, done 5 July 1933, 147 L.N.T.S. 67 (1934); a pact between the Soviet Union,
Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Roumania and Turkey, which termed any state an ag-
gressor who, according to Article 2 of the Treaty: (1) declared war on another state; (2) in-
vaded the territory of another state by force of arms; (3) attacked the territory, vessels or
aircraft of another state; (4) instituted a naval blockade; or (5) supported armed bands
within the territory of another state. See generally Wright, The Concept of Aggression in
International Law, 29 A.J.I.L. 514, 520 (1956); J. STONE. AGGRESSION AND WORLD OORDER
27-40 (1958); Brownlie, supra note 30, at 352-358.
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the same spirit which characterized the pursuit of the "renuncia-
tion of war as an instrument of national policy." Unfortunately,
these early efforts were equally fruitless.
In the aftermath of the Charter, however, a succession of pro-
tracted negotiations"° finally yielded the comprehensive definition
of aggression set forth in Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of the General
Assembly.41 Taking note of the report of the Special Committee on
the Question of Defining Aggression 2 and the resulting draft,
adopted by consensus therein, and invoking the Charter and the
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States,43 the General Assembly
adopted the recommended definition of aggression in Article 1."
The Article states that
[a]ggression is the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition. 5
Article 2 went on to point out that "[t]he first use of armed force
by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima
facie evidence of an act of aggression," although the article also
provided that the Security Council may, "in conformity with the
Charter," conclude otherwise "in the light of other relevant cir-
cumstances."
The drafters in the Special Committee saw fit to enumerate six
specific acts of aggression in Article 3 of the Definition, but for
present purposes it is sufficient to note that "[tihe invasion or
attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting
from such invasion or attack" qualifies as an act of aggression
"subject to and in accordance with the provisions of article 2." ''
Article 4 contains the further precaution that "[tjhe acts
40 See Ferencz, Defining Aggression" Where It Stands and Where It's Going, 66 A.J.I.L.
491 (1972); and his Defining Aggression-The Last Mile, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 430
(1973).
G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 19), U.N. Doe. A/9615 (1974), reprinted in 69
A.J.I.L. 480 (1975).
42 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 19), U.N. Doc. A/9619 & Corr. 1(1974). See also Badr, The
Exculpatory Effect of Self-Defense in State Responsibility, 10 GA. J. INT'T AND COMP. L. 1,
18 nn. 52-62 (1980).
, See note 64 infra.
" Without vote at the 2319th plenary meeting, December 14, 1974; 69 A.J.I.L. 480 (1975).
Id., (emphasis added).
Id., (emphasis added).
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enumerated above [in Article 3] are not exhaustive"47 leaving
scope for the Security Council to "determine that other acts con-
stitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter."
And finally, Article 5, the last substantive section of the Defini-
tion, declares that
1. No consideration of whatever nature, whether political,
economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification
for aggression.
2. A war of aggression is a crime against international peace.
Aggression gives rise to international responsibility.
3. No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting
from aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful.48
Taken as a whole, The Definition of Aggression imports a clear
restatement of the principle originally contained in Article 2,
paragraph 4; indeed, the wording of Article 1 in the Definition is
similar to that of the Charter. Further, it may be observed that
this recent reaffirmation by the international community renders
the principle even more basic to accepted state practice in that it
asserts the identity between the use of force per se, except where
it accords strictly with the provisions of the Charter, 49 and the
pejorative concept of aggression for which "[n]o consideration of
whatever nature .. .may serve as a justification . . .,,"
B. Elaboration of the Rule Constraining The Use of Force By States
In 1949, the International Court of Justice was required to
examine the onus created by Article 2, paragraph 4, when Albania
challenged the legal propriety of a British minesweeping opera-
tion in Albanian territorial waters following the misfortune of cer-
tain of His Majesty's ships exercising the right of "innocent
passage" in the Corfu Channel.51 The Court found Albania interna-
tionally responsible for the presence of the minefield and for
damages to British lives and property and while the Court found
47 /d
Id., (emphasis added).
" Article 6 provides that the Definition is not to be construed as "in any way enlarging
or diminishing the scope of the Charter" which would appear to oppose an interpretation
extending the principle contained in Article 2, paragraph 4. Similarly, Article 7 states that
the Definition does not abridge the "right to self-determination, freedom and independence,
as derived from the Charter" (emphasis added), a provision clearly aimed at "colonial and
racist regimes."
"' G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Definition of Aggression, Article 5, paragraph 1, reprinted in
69 A.J.I.L. 480, 482 (1975).
"' Corfu Channel Case [1949] I.C.J. REP. 4.
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no violation of Albanian sovereignty in the initial passage of
British ships, it was unanimous in condemning "Operation Retail,"
which followed not long after the ensuing damage to the convoy
occurred."2
With respect to the aforementioned British action, the Interna-
tional Court rejected the two-fold defense of the United Kingdom
Government in passages which are now classic expositions of the
rule in question. In answer to the assertion of "a new and special
application of the theory of intervention by means of which the
State intervening would secure possession of evidence in the ter-
ritory of another State," the Court replied that it
can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifes-
tation of a policy of force, such as has in the past, given rise to
most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the pres-
ent defects in international organization, find a place in interna-
tional law. Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the
particular form it would take here; for, from the nature of
things, it would be reserved for the most powerful States, and
might easily lead to perverting the administration of interna-
tional justice itself. 3
Further, in response to the plea of classifying "Operation Retail"
as an acceptable form of self-protection or self-help, the Court
reiterated that as
[bletween independent States, respect for territorial sovereign-
ty is an essential foundation of international relations. The
Court recognizes the Albanian Government's complete failure to
carry out its duties ... are extenuating circumstances for the ac-
tion of the United Kingdom Government. But to ensure respect
for intetational law, of which it is the organ, the Court must
declare that the action of the British Navy constituted a viola-
tion of Albanian sovereignty. 5
It has been argued cogently that the last statement quoted "is
not free from the doubt that acts of self-help not manifested as 'a
policy of force' may still be allowed by international law."' '
", Id. The Court split on the issue of Albania's responsibility, 11 votes for to 5 against;
the question of damages was reserved (10 votes to 6); and on the issue of innocent passage
14 votes to 2 against, in favour of no violation of Albanian sovereignty.
"'[1949] I.CJ. REP. 4, at 35.
Id. at 35.
U "The activities of the Royal Navy in the Corfu Channel were not immediately
necessary for the protection of British subjects and their property . . ." D. O'CONNELL, IN-
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Similarly, two arguments have been framed, in the context of the
protection of aliens abroad, urging that such actions are not
covered by the principle confirmed by the International Court.
The first argument equates the protection of nationals to the
defense of the state. Such a view entertains a contractual theory,
namely, that the state exists primarily "for the protection and
promotion of the rights of the citizens, the individuals who com-
prise it."" The second argument proceeds upon the functional
basis for distinguishing the protection of nationals, i.e., rescue,
from the (intended) infringement of the "territorial integrity or
political independence" of the target state.57
Proponents of the second form of argument see little to recom-
mend an unambiguous analogy to "defense of the State." Dr. Bowett
emphasizes that there is no ipso facto correlation between fun-
damental national interests and the interests of nationals abroad.
"In practice it cannot be said that a threat to the safety of nation-
als abroad constitutes a threat to the security of the state."" Pro-
fessor Lillich, on the other hand, voices criticisms more directly
concerned with the attainment of enforceable human rights
norms. "First, it would permit forcible self-help only where nation-
als of the acting state were the objects of protection:
humanitarian intervention in its full scope would not be available
under a self-defense rationale. Second, it undoubtedly would
encourage the use of a greater degree of force by the acting
state."59
TERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. I, at 327 (1965). Professor O'Connell remarks further that the effect
of the judgment "was, in form at least, to deprive the United Kingdom of the free exercise
of the right of innocent passage." Id. This latter comment appears deficient in its apprecia-
tion of the Court's separate opinion affirming the right of innocent passage (supra note 52)
as distinguished from its assessment of the legal status of "Operation Retail."
" "Political theories of the social contract gave rise to the view that protection, as the
duty of the state, afforded the consideration of the pactum subjectionis, and that protection
of the nationals of the state was, in effect, protection of the state itself." D. BoWETT, SELF-
DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (1958) citing DUGUIT, ETUDES DE DROTT PUBLIC 288 (1901)
and BLUNTSCHLI, THEORY OF THE STATE 305 (1898). Charles Fenwick offered a similar argu-
ment justifying the American intervention into the Dominican Republic in 1965, The
Dominican Republic: Intervention or Collective Self-Defense?, 60 A.J.I.L. 64 (1966); contra,
Bohan, The Dominican Case: Unilateral Intervention, 60 A.J.I.L. 809 (1966). See generally
A. Thomas and A. J. Thomas, The Dominican Republic Crisis, 1965, 9 HAMMARSKJOLD
FORUM 13-14 (J. Carey ed. 1967); Lillich, supra note 7, at 335-37.
17 O'CONNELL, supra note 55, at 328; A. THOMAS AND A.J. THOMAS, The Dominican Crisis,
supra note 56, at 14-15; D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 56, at
95; Lillich, Self-Help, supra note 7, At 335.
BOWETT. SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 56, at 93.
" Lillich, Self.Help, supra note 7, at 337. For a discussion of self-defense by states, see
Badr, The Exculpatory Effect of Self-Defense in State Responsibility, 10 GA. J. INT'L AND
COMP. L. 1 (1980).
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Neither of these arguments offers much in the way of legal per-
suasiveness, although the second proposition may be said to
display a proportional, common-sense approach to situations
where fundamental moral issues may be at stake0 and thus
possesses a strong intuitive appeal." However, the merits of such
an approach furnish no adequate answer to the subsequent prac-
tice of the United Nations echoing the assessment of the Interna-
tional Court in Corfu. 2
The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of States adopted by the General Assembly in
19658 went beyond the prohibition against simple "armed inter-
vention" in condemning also "all other forms of interference or at-
tempted threats against the personality of the State." However,
only the former was enumerated specifically.
More fundamental still was the catalogue of international legal
norms embodied in the United Nations Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-oper-
ation Among States." In the Preamble to the substantive provi-
sions of the Declaration, the General Assembly reaffirmed that
"the maintenance of international peace and security" was
"among the fundamental purposes of the United Nations." It
stated further "that the strict observance by States of the obliga-
tion not to intervene in the affairs of any other State is an essen-
tial condition to ensure that nations live together in peace."
Moreover, the Assembly considered it "essential that all States
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any State," in recognition of which "the progressive development
and codification" of the enumerated principles in the Declaration
was to be achieved.8
"o The celebrated "raid on Entebbe" comes immediately to mind in this respect. See note
123 infra, and accompanying text.
"4 Such a position is exploited at some length by proponents of humanitarian intervention
seeking to offer appropriate delimiting criteria. See note 148 infra.
" See generally Higgins, The Legal Limits to the Use of Force By Sovereign States:
United Nations Practice, 37 B.Y.I.L. 269 (1961); Fonteyne, Forcible Self-Help By States to
Protect Human Rights: Recent Views From the United Nations, in HUMANITARIAN INTER-
VENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 197 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
"S AIRes./2131 (XX) 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
" G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) adopted without vote at the 1883d plenary meeting, 24 October
1970. Reproduced in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970).
" "It is noteworthy that the General Assembly declared further that the 'principles of
the Charter which are embodied in this Declaration constitute basic principles of interna-
tional law,' and appealed to all States, including, thus, non-members, 'to be guided by these
principles in their international conduct and to develop their mutual relations on the basis
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The leading principle of the Declaration constituted a classic
restatement of Article 22, paragraph 4 of the Charter. It is also
worth mentioning that the third principle contained in the
Declaration, the "duty not to intervene," was expressly followed
by the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression
in drafting Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Definition," which was
adopted by General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) in 1974.7
Declarations such as the above "are not ordinary international
treaties or conventions." Nevertheless, as Professor Louis Sohn
has stated, "there is a wide consensus that these declarations actu-
ally established new rules of international law binding upon all
States."68 The proposition thus stated suggests the concept of in-
stant customary law which is the product of an affirmative consen-
sus of the international community arrived at in the forum of the
United Nations. 9 Though perhaps not conclusive, the support
generated for this idea certainly enhances its persuasive value as
well as the legal weight attributable to the foregoing examples of
United Nations practice.
C. The Need For Exceptions to the Rule in the Enforcement of
Human Rights Norms
Considerable effort has been devoted to the documentation of a
basic rule of international law and, more fundamentally, to both
the genesis and evolution of the principle embodied by the rule.
The contention so far advanced is that the rule does not admit of
exceptions save those articulated in the Charter of the United
Nations. Accepting the validity of this assertion, one confronts the
essential dilemma posed by the need to preserve fundamental
human rights in situations where especially gross violations occur
but where the United Nations is unable to act or act quickly
of strict observence of these principles.'" Sohn, The Shaping of International Law, 8 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 16 (1978).
" Supra note 42.
"7 Supra notes 41, 42, 44, 49, 50.
" Sohn, supra note 65, at 16.
69 Sohn, supra note 65, at 17, 18. The proposition was applied to the Declaration of Legal
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
approved by G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII) G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 15), U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964). See
Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: 'Instant' Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 23 (1965).
" Similar arguments have been made to the effect that international treaties of sufficient
scope may create customary law binding on non-signatories. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties
as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 B.Y.I.L. 275 (1965-66); A. D'AMATO, THE
CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-66 (1971).
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enough." The only alternative would appear to be independent
state action directed on behalf of humanity. Indeed, to recall the
classic passage from Jessup, "[i]t would seem that the only possi-
ble argument against the substitution of collective measures
under the Security Council for individual measures by a single
state would be the inability of the international organization to act
with the speed requisite to preserve life." 2
One of the first goals of the initial participants in the United
Nations experiment became the preservation of "human rights
and justice" around the globe.7 3 This intention was made explicit
in the Charter of the United Nations,7' although regrettably no
corresponding effort was made to provide a mechanism for
implementing these aims once they had been formulated.7"
Nonetheless, it cannot be suggested seriously in the wake of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and the more recent
Covenants" setting forth the basic rights belonging to all indi-
viduals that there does not exist a substantial, ever expanding,
international law of human rights received by and demanding the
adherence of the international community.78
The question, then, becomes whether the existence of this com-
peting body of international law, and the concomitant moral point
71 Apparently one of the first and certainly "[tjhe most difficult problem still confronting
the framers of the United Nations' human rights program is that of devising effective pro-
cedures for enforcement." McDougal and Bebr, Human Rights in the United Nations, 58
A.J.I.L. 603, 629 (1964).
p. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 170 (1949).
" Declaration of the United Nations, 1 January 1942, 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1942, at 25-26 (1943), cited in L. Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the
Charter, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 129 (1977).
7, See U.N. Charter Articles 1(3), 55, 56, 60, 64, 68, 76, 87 and Preamble, reprinted in
Sohn, supra note 73, at 129-31.
" "The Charter does not ... define what exactly are the fundamental human rights and
freedoms of which it speaks, nor does it make any mention of machinery to secure their
observance." J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS, 293 (6th ed., 1963). Vincent observes that
"[tihe Charter ... was primarily concerned with building an order between states and not
within them, with eliminating international war not civil conflicts. Its concern with human
rights and fundamental freedoms, values whose defense would require an intrusion into a
traditionally domestic matter, was more aspiration than legislation." VINCENT, supra note 1,
at 236.
" Approved by G.A. Res. 217A (III), 10 December 1948, G.A.O.R. (III) U.N. Doc. A/810,
71-77.
" International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) 49-52; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, id. at 52-58; and Optional Protocol, id. at 59-60.
"' See generally the materials contained in L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1975) and the companion volume, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON IN-
TERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1973).
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of view projected from fundamental principles of humanity,
somehow authorizes or at least justifies humanitarian interven-
tion by one or more state actors in derogation of the longstanding
rule which has dominated the discussion thus far. The issue is
exacerbated in those instances where "there is a morally irresist-
able case for intervention"7 9 and raises the subsidiary questions of
how to distinguish appropriate cases for humanitarian inter-
vention from those lacking legitimacy and how to furnish appro-
priate safeguards to prevent abuse.
Before examining this question and its corollaries directly, at
least a partial answer may be obtained from a canvass of the prac-
tice of states invoking the "law of humanity" as the basis for inter-
vention, both prior to the existence of the United Nations rule
regulating the use of force by states, and in the era following the
Charter.
III. STATE PRACTICE IN THE CAUSE OF HUMANITY: AN
OVERVIEW
It has been suggested that "[t]he results of an historical survey
are likely to depend on which instances the surveyor includes."80
Bearing this in mind, the intention here is merely to treat briefly
a few of the traditional and most controversial leading precedents
cited under the rubric of humanitarian intervention. In deference
to the claim that history reveals unanswered cases "crying out"
for intervention on similar if not more persuasive grounds,81 it is
appropriate to mention a few examples of such situations.
A. Humanitarian Intervention: Classic Cases
In 1860, the Concert of Europe authorized a French naval
expeditionary force possessing some 6,000 troops to go to the
rescue of the Christian Maronite population of Mount Lebanon in
Syria who were then reported to be threatened by massacre by
Muslim Druses, also subjects of the Ottoman Empire.2 The ration-
ale for intervention was the protection of "Christian minorities,"
which was the basis upon which the Concert had intervened
' Farer, Humanitarian Intervention: The View from Charlottesville, in R. LILLICH,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 157 (1973).
Franck and Rodley, After Bangla Desh, supra note 8, at 279.
" Cf. id. at 290-98.
See generally the notes and diplomatic correspondence reproduced in SOHN &
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 78, at 143-78.
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"diplomatically" in 1842, establishing a separate local admin-
istration to protect the Maronite community.8 This time,
however, force was deemed necessary, but only by France, whom
Great Britain suspected of having other than "humanitarian
goals" for the assertion of a military presence in the Eastern
Mediterranean." Therefore, a six month time limit was imposed
on the French occupation to restore order in the region. France
managed to negotiate an extension for a total of nine months
whereupon the expeditionary force was withdrawn. It is notable
that Turkey consented to the kind offer of aid extended by the
Concert, although it may be argued that under the circumstances
no other answer was possible or, in any event, would have made
any difference.85
The humanitarian "intercession" by the Great Powers of
Europe and the United States on behalf of the Armenian popula-
tion of Turkey stands in marked contrast to the earlier action
taken by the Concert in Syria.8 Originally, Turkey was to have
acceded to Russian occupation of Armenia for the effectuation of
reforms pursuant to the Treaty of San Stefano in 1877. However,
a new series of political priorities dictated a renegotiation under
the Treaty of Berlin87 the following year whereby Turkey was left
on her own good behaviour to carry forward "improvements and
reforms."88 Still, some 200,000 Armenians "disappeared" between
1890 and 1913 and perhaps one million individuals perished prior
to the negotiation of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920.89 The treaty
comprised the peace settlement with Turkey and included inter
alia provision for the creation of a separate state to protect the
remaining Armenian citizenry. Unfortunately, Turkey had no
8" The Sultan of Turkey thereupon agreed in 1845 to appoint separate administrators
with the appropriate religious affiliation of each of the two (Druse and Maronite) provinces
of Mount Lebanon. Id at 144; Franck and Rodley, After Bangla Desh, supra note 8, at 281;
T. HOLLAND, THE EUROPEAN CONCERT IN THE EASTERN QUESTION 206 (1885).
84 "In general it may be said that the British devotion to the preservation of the integrity
of the Ottoman Empire was not matched by a similar French steadfastness of purpose..."
R. ALBRECHT-CARRIE, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA
109-10 (1958).
85 "Turkish authorization recalls Fielding's remark in Jonathan Wild: he 'would have
ravished her, if she had not, by a timely compliance, prevented him.' ", Franck and Rodley,
After Bangla Desh, supra note 8, at 281.
' See documents on the diplomatic efforts made by the United States and other govern-
ments between 1904 and 1917, reprinted in SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 78, at 181-92.
13 July 1878, 49 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 749.
" Id at Article 61.
Treaty of Peace Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey, 10 August 1920, Arts.
88-89 (did not come into force); reprinted in 15 A.J.I.L. (Supp.) 235 (1921).
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intention of complying with the treaty, the Allies did not deem it
expedient to force the issue," and the renegotiations which
resulted in the Treaty of Lausanne9 fell silent on the issue of
Armenian statehood. The cautious pleas for affirmative action in
the area of Armenian human rights tendered by the United States
Ambassador in Turkey to Washington in 1915,92 simply verified that,
in this particular instance, a policy of humanitarian intervention
was not congruent with the governing priorities of statecraft.
Evidence of more disturbing examples of intervention and the
failure to intervene is furnished in Hitler's reference to "assaults
on the life and liberty of minorities; and [to] the purpose of disarm-
ing Czech troops and terrorist bands threatening the lives of
minorities"9 preceding the German invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The apparent acquiescence of capable world powers-apart from
the usual rhetoric-to the imminent extermination of European
Jewry during the same period through to their actual elimination
by the end of the Second World War94 is a tragic example of the
failure to intervene pre-emptively.
B. Post-1945 Practice of States
It has been observed after a careful pleading of the facts "that if
ever there was a case for the use of forcible self-help to protect
lives, the Congo rescue operation was it."95 The complexities of
9 28 L.N.T.S. 12 (1924).
(Morgenthau) to Secretary of State Lansing, 11 August 1915: "I earnestly beg the
Department to give this matter urgent and exhaustive consideration . . . It is difficult for
me to restrain myself from doing something to stop this attempt to exterminate a race, but
I realize that I am here as Ambassador and must abide by the principles of non-interference
with the internal affairs of another country.", reprinted in SOHN & BUERGENTHAL supra
note 78, at 187-88.
, The following excerpt of a speech delivered by Charles Evans Hughes on 23 January
1924 concerning the priorities behind the Treaty of Lausanne illustrates the point. "In
March, 1921, the Allied Powers clearly appreciated that it would be impossible, short of
armed allied military intervention in Turkey, to impose the Treaty of Sevres. It would
seem that at no time was such armed intervention seriously considered..." 18 A.J.I.L. 229,
237 (1924), excerpted in SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 78, at 193.
"3 Proclamation on the German Occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, 15 March 1939, 4
Docs. ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939 (3d ser.) no. 259, at 257; I. BROWNLIE, USE OF
FORCE BY STATES 340.
" On U.S. diplomatic efforts see HACKWORTH, 3 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 642-47
(1942), and FEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RESCUE: THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION AND THE
HOLOCAUST 1938-1945 (1970), cited in Franck and Rodley, After Bangla Desh, supra note 8,
at 292-93.
"5 Lillich, supra note 7, at 340; Weisberg, The Congo Crisis 1964: A Case Study in
Humanitarian Intervention, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 261 (1972); see generally, SOHN & BUERGEN-
THAL, supra note 78, at 195-206.
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the power struggles in this troubled region of the world following
its independence from Belgian colonial rule in 1960 and the
resulting intercession of United Nations forces at that time are
beyond the scope of this discussion." However, they do serve as
an introduction to the situation prevailing in the fall of 1964 when
the de facto government of Moise Tshombe based in Leopoldville
was confronted by the rebel movement of Christophe Gbenye in
control of the Stanleyville district of the fragmented nation.
Gbenye had arrested all the (white) "foreigners" who could be
found, in retaliation against Belgian support of Tshombe. In
response to some killings and Gbenye's threats of widespread
massacre,97 a combined British, American, and Belgian rescue
operation employing American planes and Belgian paratroops
landed in Stanleyville, rescued some 2,000 persons in four days
and subsequently, in nearby Paulis, rescued several hundred more
persons within a week. The serious and immediate nature of the
perceived threat to human life," the limited duration and strictly
delimited purpose of the operation,99 and the express consent of
the Tshombe government to the planned intervention,100 all
enhanced the moral rectitude of the enterprise.
The Congo precedent was perceived far differently, on the
other hand, by a significant number of Afro-Asian nations which
expressed the view that it constituted "a flagrant violation of the
Charter of the United Nations and a threat to the peace and
security of the African continent."1 ' There also appeared to be
" For a convenient synopsis see DONELAN & GRIEVE, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: CASE
HISTORIES 1945-1970, at 203-10 (1973); E. LEFEVER, CRISIS IN THE CONGO, A UNITED NATIONS
FORCE IN ACTION (1965); C. YOUNG, POLITICS IN THE CONGO, DECOLONIZATION AND INDEPENDENCE
(1965).
"' "[W]e will dress ourselves with the skins of the Americans and Belgians ...." quoted
in 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 18 (1965).
" Letter from the Belgian Representative to the United Nations to the President of the
Security Council, 21 November 1964, 19 S.C.O.R. Suppl., U.N. Doc. S16055 at 64-66 (1964);
excerpted in SOHp & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 78, at 195-97.
" "This operation is humanitarian-not military. It is designed to avoid bloodshed-not
to engage the rebel forces in combat. Its purpose is to accomplish its task quickly and
withdraw-not to seize or hold territory." Statement of U.S. Government, Annex II of let-
ter from U.S. representative to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council,
24 November 1964, U.N. Doc. S/6062, S.C.O.R., supra note 98, at 188.
" ". .. I have authorized the Belgian and United States Governments to render my
Government the necessary assistance in organizing a humanitarian mission to make it
possible for these foreign hostages to be evacuated." Letter from Prime Minister Tshombe
to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 24 November 1964, U.N. Doc. S/6060, ex-
cerpted in SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 78, at 197.
,'0 Memorandum annexed to letter from the Representative of Afghanistan (and
representatives of 21 other members) to the President of the Security Council, 1 December
1964, U.N. Doc. S/6076 and Add 1-5. Id. at 203-04.
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further suspicion in the matter of the cost in African lives of the
preservation of the Western Europeans who were rescued.10,2
Similar considerations were invoked by President Johnson
when he ordered the landing by the United States of some 20,000
troops in the Dominican Republic in 1965.1"3 However, this prece-
dent appears less credible than the Congo example for a number
of reasons: many more people perished after, rather than before, the
American intervention;'0 ' the duration of the intervention by
American troops was prolonged far beyond the time required to
ensure the safety of the lives and property of Americans and
others; ° and, as a purely legal matter, the operative effect of
Articles 15 and 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American
States on the status of the initial act of unilateral intervention
tainted the enterprise.1°6 While all of these points have been
debated at length,07 it would appear safe to conclude that the
102 "The famous humanitarian operation of Stanleyville has just proved to us that one
white ... is worth thousands and thousands of blacks." Statement of Ambassador Ganao, 19
S.C.O.R. 1170th mtg. 15 (1964), cited in Franck and Rodley, supra note 8, at 288.
103 See statement reprinted in 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 20 (1965). For a summary of the
facts see DONELAN & GRIEVE, supra note 96, at 254-58; relevant documents are reproduced
in L. SOHN, CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW 1025-72 (2d ed., 1956); A. LOWENTHAL, THE
DOMINICAN INTERVENTION (1972); J. SLATER. INTERVENTION AND NEGOTIATION, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE DOMINICAN CRISIS (1970); THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 56.
.04 The point has been made by Franck and Rodley, After Bangla Desh, supra note 8, at
287; "Although the Johnson Administration had proclaimed as one of the main purposes of
the intervention the need to save Dominican lives in a bloody civil war, in fact most of the
estimated three thousand Dominican deaths occurred after the intervention . . ." SLATER,
supra note 103, at 203.
10' United States Marines and paratroops landed in the Dominican Republic on 28 April
1965. And American troops continued to form the nucleus of the Inter-American Police
Force (IAPF) which officially took over the task of maintaining order on 23 May 1965, and
remained in the country following elections supervised by U.N. and OAS missions until 21
September 1966. DONELAN & GRIEVE, supra note 103.
" Articles 18 and 20 as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, 1967, Treaty Series
No. 1-C, O.A.S. OFF. Rec., OEA/Ser. A/2 (Eng.) Rev. (1968). Article 18 provides that "[no
State. or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State." Article 20 states that
"[t]he territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of
military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or in-
directly, or any grounds whatever." See also the condemnations of the U.S. action as viola-
tions of the O.A.S. Charter pronounced by Senators Fulbright, 111 Cong. Rec. 23859-60
(1965), and Morse, id. at 11121. On the genesis of the norms embodied by these articles see
Cabranes, Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the Inter-American System, 65 MICH. L.
REV. 1147 (1967).
'o' In support of the legitimacy of the United States' intervention see generally THOMAS
& THOMAS, supra note 56; Lillich, supra note 7, at 334-38. Contra, Franck and Rodley, After
Bangla Desh, supra note 8, at 287; seeking to justify the United States action in legal terms
is an arid pursuit, see Maclaren, The Dominican Crisis: An Inter-American Dilemma, 4
CDN. YRHK INT'L L. 178, 181 (1966).
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spectre of another Communist nation in the Western hemisphere
and the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine vied with the principles of
humanity '°1 in motivating the United States to intervene-and to
stay until "appropriate" restoration of order was achieved.
In the aftermath of the Dominican Republic imbroglio, a far
more serious example of human rights violations emerged where,
in the view of a contemporary observer, "[tihese circumstances
clearly call for employment of the exceptional international legal
institution of humanitarian intervention."'" No such intervention
occurred on behalf of the Biafrans who were in the process of be-
ing exterminated during the Nigerian Civil War.10 British and
American sentiments politically favored Nigeria; the United
Kingdom continued to supply light armaments to the Nigerians
while the United States maintained an arms embargo against both
sides. The actual conflict spanned two years following the
Nigerian invasion of the self-proclaimed independent state of
Biafra in the summer of 1967 until "starvation, disease, and the
waning of hope, ended Biafran resistance.""' It is notable that
what relief of human suffering was undertaken came in the form
of relief operations organized by the International Committee of
Red Cross and several churches." 2
Higher still on the scale of human rights deprivations was the
untold suffering that occurred during the conflict resulting from
the secession of East Pakistan from the Islamabad government to
form the independent nation of Bangladesh."3 India invaded the
' Compare the statement of President Johnson, supra note 103, with his radio
broadcast of 2 May 1965 where the President stated that the insurrection in the Dominican
Republic had been usurped "by a band of Communist conspirators.... The American na-
tions cannot, must not and will not permit the establishment of another Communist govern-
ment in the Western hemisphere." Excerpted in DONELAN & GRIEVE. supra note 96, at 256.
100 Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos (memorandum prepared
and revised in September of 1968 with the collaboration of McDougal) in R. LILLICH,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 167; for a synopsis of the Nigerian Civil War see DONELAN &
GRIEVE, supra note 96, at 259-64; J. DE ST. JORRE, THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR (1972); A. KIRK-
GREENE, CRISIS AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA, A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY 1966-69 (1971).
110 "The resistance of the Biafrans was fortified by a deep fear of massacre, which was
further sustained by the speeches of their leader, Ojukwu, and which the counter-promises
of Gowan could do little to allay." DONELAN & GRIEVE, supra note 96, at 262.
Id. at 264.
"' An excellent concise overview of the origins and practice of the International Red
Cross may be found in the first of six lectures on Practice, Norms and Reform of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Rescue Operations delivered by B. Morse at the Hague Academy of In-
ternational Law, 8 August 1977 (forthcoming: RECUEIL DES COURS, 1978).
11 See the case study of Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic
Tale of Two Cities-Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistanl, 66 A.J.I.L. 321
(1972). For basic background documents refer to Documents: Civil War in Pakistan, 4
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disputed area amidst a massive outpouring of refugees for the
purpose of securing the new nation's sovereign independence,
"glad," to quote Ambassador Sen, "that we have on this particular
occasion absolutely nothing but the purest of motives and the
purest of intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from
what they are suffering.""" The political benefits (and costs) for In-
dia of this action are not the concern of this discussion. But it is
relevant to note that the brunt of the effort borne in the preserva-
tion of human life and dignity was undertaken by the United
Nations' relief effort, the largest entertained since the conclusion
of the Second World War. '15 It can certainly be argued that "all
this humanitarian assistance did not address itself to the root
causes" 16 of the conflict, but such an argument does not compel a
conclusion supporting the unilateral use of force to address the
problem thus raised.
The United Nations Relief Operation in East Pakistan
(UNEPRO) assumes added precedential value in that, notwithstand-
ing the bete noire of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, neither
Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, nor the
Government of Pakistan "allowed" this chronic problem "to stand
in the way of the relief of large-scale human suffering in a situa-
tion of internal conflict.' '.. Moreover, UNEPRO was from its in-
ception clearly a result of the Secretary-General first approaching
President Khan. Thus,
[tihe Secretary-General initiated the beginning of a body of law
by relying explicitly upon the statement of fundamental pur-
poses in the Charter, and his responsibility as the executive of
the organization, to insure that human well-being was protected
and humanitarian principles upheld."'
This selective analysis of relevant state practice will conclude
with a brief look at three instances in which humanitarian interven-
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 524 (1971); Franck and Rodley, The Law, The United Nations and
Bangla Desh, 2 ISRAEL YRBK ON HUM. RIGHTS 142 (1972).
"' Statement of the Indian Ambassador to the United Nations (Sen) before the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1606, 86 (1971), cited in Franck and Rodley, The United Nations
and Bangla Desh, supra note 113, at 164.
", 8 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE (No. 7) 91 (July 1971).
,, Franck and Rodley, The United Nations and Bangla Desh, supra note 113, at 148.
Quoted from text of second Hague lecture (preliminary draft) delivered by B. Morse
on the United Nations Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 9 August 1977 (forthcoming:
RECUEIL DES COURS, 1978).
118 Id.
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tion was claimed to have been legally employed, specifically, in the
context of the protection of nationals at risk abroad. The first
example is the seizure and recovery of the United States mer-
chant ship Mayaguez in 1975.119 The ship and crew were captured
by Cambodian naval units in what Cambodia claimed to be her
own territorial waters. 20 The United States served a twenty-four
hour ultimatum on Cambodian authorities, whereupon President
Ford authorized first an air attack and, two days later, a Marine
assault to effect a release of the ship and crew. The second attack
took place following Cambodia's official broadcast that the ship
and crew were no longer in custody."' Secretary of State Kis-
singer's comment that "the impact ought to be to make clear that
there are limits beyond which the United States cannot be
pushed,"'" indicates that perhaps "pride" more than "humanity"
was at the bottom of the American response to a perceived threat
where the crew of the Mayaguez appeared to be in danger only
during the rescue attempts of their countrymen. Naturally, such
observations benefit from the security of hindsight; nevertheless,
this unilateral resort to force by the United States and its appar-
ent disregard of the offices of the United Nations, especially in a
situation where the preservation of life was not immediately, if
ever, in question, cogently illustrates the essential nature and
value of the principles so far discussed.
The celebrated Israeli commando raid on Entebbe,' 3 on the
other hand, cannot be so lightly dismissed. The apparent
legitimacy of the rescue operation freeing the 105 Jewish
passengers holding Israeli or dual citizenship from the clutches of
terrorists at the Ugandan airport in July of 1976 was heightened
by the equally apparent complicity of the Amin regime with the
terrorist plot.' 4 Amin's notorious reputation could not help but
increase support for the Israeli initiative.
,,9 See Paust, Comment: The Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez, 85 YALE L.J. 774
(1976); Note, Pueblo and Mayaguez: A Legal Analysis, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. 79 (1977);
R. ROWAN, THE FOUR DAYS OF MAYAGUEZ (1975).
'" Thailand and Vietnam also laid claim to sovereignty in this area. The official American
position that the Mayaguez was seized on the "high seas" would thus appear to be more
than questionable, if not spurious. Paust, supra note 119, at 781-84, 804-05.
21 Id. at 781.
N.Y. Times, May 17, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
, See Note, Entebbe: Use of Force For the Protection of Nationals Abroad, 9
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 117 (1977); Krift, Self-Defense and Self-Help: The Israeli Raid on
Entebbe, 4 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 43 (1977).
1' See the statement by Israeli Ambassador Herzog before the United Nations Security
Council during the Entebbe debates, U.N. Docs. S/PV. 1939 at 36-50 (1977); S/PV. 1942 at
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In practical terms, the Israeli commandos accomplished with
consummate brilliance what they set out to do. It was a rare com-
bination of circumstances that made the operation possible; the
hostages remained lightly guarded in a location readily accessible
to an airborne assault force and Israel had the element of com-
plete surprise on its side. Thus, even though Entebbe may be
cited with confidence as one of those "morally irresistible" cases,
it is also true that the "success" of the enterprise and the par-
ticular circumstances allowing for that success go to the founda-
tion of its legitimacy as a "political" and a moral act in the cause of
humanity.125
Strictly legal arguments, however, seem less persuasive. The
argument of self-defense, taken together with variations of the
Caroline doctrine"' invoked by Ambassador Herzog before the
Security Council 2' and subsequently by scholars,128 would appear
to be misplaced for several reasons. First, it is difficult to accept
the proposition that danger to Israeli citizens in Entebbe airport,
however grave, constituted any threat to the "territorial integ-
rity" or "political independence" of the State of Israel.29 Second,
such an application of the doctrine of self-defense involves
assumptions about the political nature of the nation-state which
may no longer be considered valid.13 Finally, the doctrine, strictly
35-42.(1977); and similarly Mr. Scranton (United States) U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1941 at 31 (1977);
and Mr. Richard (United Kingdom) especially on the issue of the disappearance and ap-
parent murder of Mrs. Dora Bloch, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1940 at 42-45 (1977). Contra, statements
of Mr. Abdalla (Uganda) U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1939 at 11-25 (1977); U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1943 at 56-62
(1977).
125 The generally favourable disposition of the world community towards the Israeli ac-
tion might have been radically altered had the commandos not succeeded in their objective
or if a pitched battle had occurred. Professor Schwarzenberger, in discussing interventions
of a more permanent kind (Guatemala, 1954; Hungary, 1956) has remarked that "[vliewed in
the light of the pattern of political sovereignty, it becomes intelligible why, in a system of
power politics in disguise, some interverstions are successful and, ultimately tend to become
legalized and vice versa." INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 76 (1971).
'" Secretary of State Webster envisaged a "necessity of self-defense, instant, over-
whelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." 30 BRITISH AND
FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 193 (1843). This classic formulation appears to exhibit a "good fit"
with the facts of Entebbe except when i;ne recalls that the doctrine was enunciated in the
context of a pre-emptive strike in anticipation of an imminent violation of the "territorial in-
tegrity" of a neighbouring state. See J. MOORE, 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-12
(1906); Jennings, The Caroline and Macleod Cases, 32 A.J.I.L. 82 (1938).
127 Cf. U.N. Doc. SIPV. 1939 at 52 (1977).
IN The argument was put convincingly by Professor Yoram Dinstein during a Seminar on
International Law and the Management of Conflict held at the Faculty of Law, Queen's
University at Kingston, March 10, 1977. But see note 126 supra.
129 See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
IS The gradual recognition of individuals as "subjects" of international law separate and
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construed, is self-limiting with regard to humanitarian interven-
tion and ignores the moral basis for such a concept. '
The further suggestion, that Uganda's apparent complicity in
the terrorist plot justified the Israeli intervention in accordance
with the principles enunciated in the Declaration Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, is even less
persuasive. The clause relied upon by United States Ambassador
Scranton in the Security Council" 2 was taken and applied to the
facts of Entebbe in a manner totally inconsistent with the context
in which the statement appears in the Declaration. He offered it
as explanation in part of the leading principle "that States shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any State . . .
.
-
A more recent episode involved the hijacking of a Lufthansa
airliner in October of 1977"s by an obscure terrorist group and
culminated in an assault upon the aircraft and rescue of its
passengers by specially trained German police at Mogadishu Air-
port15 in Somalia. It recalled in many respects the earlier Israeli
action. However, the two incidents are distinguishable on one
basic point: the German rescue operation at Mogadishu was exec-
uted throughout with the explicit consent and active cooperation
distinct from their national governments belies the notion that there exi.-ts an absolute
identity between the instrumentality of the state and the individuals wh, comprise it.
Hence, individuals may now be entitled to bring grievances on their own behalf before in-
ternational tribunals. Cf Art. 25 of the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, in
force 3 September 1953, Council of Europe, Collected Texts, Section 1 Doc. 1 (7th ed.,
Strasbourg 1971); the Optional Protocol to the recent Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 77 (not yet in force); Article 14 par. 1 of the International Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by A./Res. 2106A (XX) 21
December 1965, in force 4 January 1969. 20 U.N. GAOR Suppl. (No. 14), U.N. Doc. No.
A/6014, at 47-51; compare with note 56 supra. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht has posited the view
that "in relation to both rights and duties the individual is the final subject of all law." IN.
TERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 69 (1950).
131 Cf. Lillich, supra note 7, at 337.
13 "Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, investigating, assisting or par-
ticipating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized
activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts
referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force." Cited in U.N. Doc.
S/PV. 1941 at 33 (1977).
'" See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
'" On October 13, 1977, a Lufthansa Boeing 737 jet liner with 92 passengers and crew
aboard on a flight from Majorca to Frankfurt was forced by Arab-speaking gunmen to diver
to Dubai via Rome, Cyprus and Bahrain. N.Y. Times, October 14, 1977, at 3, col. 1. The air-
craft then proceeded to Aden, where the pilot appears to have been murdered, and finally
to Mogadishu. Id, October 18, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
" Id, October 18, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
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of the Somalian authorities."' Consequently, the legal issues com-
ing into play in the Entebbe incident, and the fundamental issues
upon which this discussion has focused, did not arise at
Mogadishu. It was a simple and sincere act of comity between
nations.
One might speculate on the pattern of German behavior had
Somalia not responded to the crisis as it did. But the fact that
Somalia did respond in a positive fashion to a manifest deprivation
of human rights, coupled with an emerging world law to suppress
acts of aerial piracy and international terrorism,"7 suggests that
circumstances may not again-in the perception of individually
aggrieved state actors-give cause for another Entebbe.
C. Practical Constraints: The Iranian Crisis
Very seldom do the practical circumstances surrounding a
threat to the lives and safety of one country's citizenry within the
territory of another allow for effective intervention on
humanitarian grounds. One lesson of Entebbe seems to be that
modern terrorists are not inclined to repeat mistakes.
The practical limitations of the doctrine became painfully evi-
dent in the recent crisis in Iran, which began with the attack on
the United States Embassy in Teheran in November 1979 and con-
tinued with the subsequent taking hostage of its staff by militant
student supporters of the Ayatollah Khomeini. As of this writing
a few of the American hostages have been released by their cap-
tors, but the fate of the majority preoccupies not only the United
States Government but the world. The flagrant disregard of the
principle of diplomatic immunity by the Iranian action strikes at
"3 Klaus Boiling (spokesman for the West German Government) "read a statement issued
jointly by the Government and the leaders of all the parties in Parliament that praised the
Somali Government of President Mohammed Siad Barre and said that without full agree-
ment and help from the Somali authorities the military action against the plane could not
have been carried out and the passengers could not have been saved. Chancellor Schmidt
sent President Barre a telegram saying 'We will never forget,' Mr. Boiling said." Id.
October 18, 1977, at 12, col. 1.
"' Cf. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft
(done at Tokyo, 14 September 1963; in force 4 December 1969) 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft (16 December 1970; in force October 14, 1971) 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192;
The Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation (23 September 1971; in force 26 January 1973); European Convention on the Sup-
pression of Terrorism reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976). See Franck and Lockwood,
Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism, 68 A.J.I.L. 69
(1974); Friedlander, Terrorism and International Law: What is Being Done?, 8 RUTGERS-
CAMDEN L.J. 383 (1977).
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the very heart of the international legal system and the ability of
states to sustain relations with one another. A full assessment of
Iran's challenge to the international order must await the comple-
tion of events. Nontheless, the seriousness of the challenge is
clear.
For present purposes, recognition of a perhaps obvious fact of
the crisis in Iran will suffice. Early in November, the situation sug-
gested that no application of force could effect a release of the
hostages without virtually guaranteeing their certain death; they
were reportedly heavily guarded, securely bound and possibly
"booby-trapped" against forced rescue. Thus, it became clear to
the Carter administration and to others that "it is beyond our
power to produce the result we want by physical self-help."1 38
While intervention could be contemplated for a variety of other
purposes, e.g., teaching Iran a lesson or flexing its muscles to
preserve the international reputation of the United States, these
were not necessarily responsive to humanitarian considerations. 9
The Iranian crisis graphically illustrates the point that
humanitarian intervention will fall short of fulfilling its primary
objective so long as the human rights violator takes the com-
paratively easy precautions necessary to prevent access within ac-
ceptable levels of risk, which is precisely what the terrorists at
Entebbe neglected to do.' 0 Further, it appears that in such situa-
tions the only tenable recourse for achieving the humanitarian ob-
jective is through influencing the offender to do on his own what
self-help by the offended state party cannot otherwise accomplish.
This kind of approach to the management of international con-
flict has been developed most extensively by Professor Roger
Fisher at the Harvard Law School.'" The example of Iran may to a
large extent lend credence to his views.' The fact that the United
States chose to resort to the Security Council,' to go to the Inter-
"' Fisher, Helping the Iranians Change Their Minds, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1979, at 23, col. 1;
Burt, U.S. Quandary In Iran Crisis: Use of Quiet Diplomacy Is Seen as Only Choice, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 9, 1979, at A12, col. 1.
I" This is not to say that humanitarian considerations are the only ones at stake for the
United States in the Iranian crisis-only that as a measure of the validity of the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention per se they are clearly the most relevant.
140 See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
36 See FISHER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR BEGINNERS (1969); FISHER, INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION: A WORKING GUIDE (draft ed. 1978); FISHER, POINTS OF CHOICE (1978).
". See Diplomacy and Retaliation: What Did the U.S. Mean? And What Does Iran
Want?, text of interview by The Boston Globe, Nov. 22, 1979, at 1, 18, 19.
,,8 The United States "strongly supported" Secretary General Waldheim's request of the
Security Council on November 25th to deal with the Iranian crisis. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26,
1979, at Al, A13, A14, col. 3. On the eve of the new year the Security Council voted by 11
votes to 0 with 4 abstentions (Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Kuwait and Bangladesh) set-
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national Court of Justice... and to place faith in the good offices of
the Secretary General of the United Nations,"' indicates some
belief on the part of President Carter and his advisors that in-
itiatives designed to influence the Ayatollah and his followers to
amend their conduct ultimately would be more helpful than
anything the United States could do on its own by force of arms.
While grave doubts remain as of this writing concerning what
politically acceptable approach' would work to secure release of
the American hostages, it is significant that there was con-
siderable support for the view condemning military intervention
as an unacceptable alternative.
D. Overall Assessment
There are few good examples of humanitarian intervention. One
writer, who was commenting prior to the Congo episode in 1964,
expressed the view that "state practice justifies the conclusion
that no genuine case of humanitarian intervention has occurred,
with the possible exception of the occupation of Syria in 1860 and
1861.""' Other commentators offer a more liberal interpretation of
cases eligible for inclusion,"' but the fact remains that, "[ojn
balance, very little good has been wrought in its name."1 9
ting a January 7th deadline for the release of the hostages after which time the adoption of
economic sanctions against Iran would be considered. Toronto Globe and Mail, Jan. 1, 1980,
at 1, col. 1.
... See Gwertzman, U.S. Bids World Court Intercede with Iran for Release of Hostages,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1979, at Al; for text of U.S. brief to the court, id. at A16; for discus-
sion and excerpts of the interim decision of the World Court calling for an immediate
release of the remaining American hostages see N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1979 at 1.
"' The current visit of Mr. Waldheim to Teheran in the first week of 1980 has not met
with much success since, while he was able to confer with members of the Revolutionary
Council governing Iran, the nation's acknowledged leader Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini has
refused to see the Secretary General. Reportedly, the Ayatollah "seems to feel that the
United Nations is only a tool of the superpowers and that Mr. Waldheim, as its top officer,
cannot be trusted." N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1980, at Al, col. 4.
"0 Apparently, delivering up the Shah of Iran as ransom does not fall within this
category. As violations of human rights are so often the result of political acts for political
ends, so, too, are humanitarian considerations politically determined. For example, in
evaluating the Iranian crisis, Professor Roger Fisher assessed the priorities of the United
States as follows: "Our purposes are, first, power-to preserve the reputation and prestige
of the United States; second, peace-to enhance respect for international law and order,
largely by avoiding bad precedents; and, third, success-to win the release of the
hostages." N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1979, at 23, col. 1.
"I I. BROWNLIE, USE OF FORCE BY STATES 340; for earlier support of a similar view see B.
RODICK, THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 49-50 (1928); DUNN, supra note
14.
"' Lillich, supra note 7; Cf. earlier writers such as BORCHARD, supra note 12, HODGES,
supra note 13 and STOWELL, supra note 21.
"' Franck and Rodley, supra note 8, at 278.
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Looking more closely at the particular examples cited in the
foregoing discussion, it appears that the precedents offered by the
intervention in the Congo, at Entebbe and most recently at
Mogadishu exhibit the strongest justifications for intervention by
state actors. Bangladesh is distinguishable from the point of view
already taken in that inter alia, human rights deprivations received
more attention from the non-political relief operation of UNEPRO
than through India, the intervening state.
Two of the three "strong" cases, then, do not apply, at least in-
sofar as the unlawful use of force is concerned, by virtue of the ex-
plicit consent to intervention given by the target state prior to
the actual act of intervention. The uncertain political situation in
the Congo, however, does raise the issue of what constitutes valid
consent and by whom.10 Nevertheless, recalling the definition of
intervention originally offered by this analysis,' the presence of
consent operates to negate any conflict with either the principle
opposing the use of force by states or the general principles of in-
ternational law. 52
Thus, one is left with a consideration of Entebbe: a situation in
which there are competing legal principles and the fundamental
moral issue which cannot be ignored. It is appropriate to recall
United Nations Ambassador Herzog's impassioned statement in
defense of Israel before the Security Council after Entebbe that
"[tihere is also a moral law, and by all that is moral on this earth
Israel has the right to do what it did. Indeed, it had also the duty
to do so."'5
IV. THE PREMISE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
A REBUTTAL
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention makes what is essen-
tially a moral argument: that there should be a legal foundation
for the use of force where violations of fundamental human rights
's' Cf. also the French intervention in Syria, supra notes 82-85.
151 THOMAS AND THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION, supra note 9.
152 "If a state consents to an interference within its protected sphere of interests prior to
or simultaneously with the act of interference, the act can be said to be legitimate by prin-
ciples of traditional international law. The consenting state exercises its sovereign right in
so doing, and the consent on the other hand grants the right to the intervening state. In
reality this type of interference cannot be called intervention, inasmuch as intervention
signifies an act or threat of compulsion or coercion of the will of a state by another, an im-
position of the will of the intervenor. If consent is given freely, there is no imposition of
will." THOMAS AND THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 99.
1' U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1939 (1977) at 51.
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cross an undefined frontier of acceptable human conduct. This
argument speaks especially to those acts which are perceived by
the international community as an intolerable affront to basic
human dignity and to the collective conscience of mankind. Such
acts continue to occur and they can be neither avoided nor ig-
nored, as the precedent of Entebbe makes abundantly clear. But
the salient point is that these situations generate "hard cases," to
employ the terminology of Professor Ronald Dworkin," ' in the
sense that the moral principles behind the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention are competing for precedence against
what is more than a mere "policy" of nonintervention reflective of
a majority consensus in the community of nations. Indeed, it
should be recognized that the opposition to this doctrine of in-
tervention also may be phrased in terms of humanitarian con-
sideration.
Proponents of humanitarian intervention seek to fashion a legal
framework under which state actors may violate the sovereignty
of a delinquent state either unilaterally or in concert,15 when it ap-
pears that the human rights offender will otherwise go unchecked.
In appreciation of the potential for subversion of the doctrine'" to
self-serving national aspirations, these same theorists have at-
tempted to circumscribe the doctrine through various delimiting
criteria.
Typically, an evaluation of possible cases calling for humanitar-
ian intervention would include the following criteria: the im-
', The present writer is here adapting in part Professor Dworkin's theory of judicial in-
terpretation to be followed in instances where the law apparently gives no obviously "right
answer" to the case presented. The theory presupposes that there is a right answer in
every case and that this answer may be obtained through a process of discovering and
weighing the principles governing the particular dispute, the outcome of which will decide
the "rights" of the competing parties and ultimately whose rights are to prevail. Fundamen-
tal thereto is the notion that, generally, principles-statements determining the rights of
individuals-prevail over policies-statements indicative of social goals-and not vice-
versa. While the foregoing provides only the most simplistic view of a complex philo-
sophical framework for legal analysis, the purpose is to apply the theory in simple terms,
casting states in the role of individual "legal" persons in the community of nations. See
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975); see generally DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977) (esp. Chs. 1 to 4), and No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1978).
.5 Quincy Wright has observed that "intervention does not gain in legality under
customary international law by being collective rather than individual"; see The Legality of
Intervention Under the United Nations Charter, 51 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 79, 86 (1957).
1" An early proponent of the doctrine has emphasized that "(i)t is a big mistake, in
general, to stop short of recognition of an inherently just principle, (merely) because of the
possibility of non-genuine invocation." Fonteyne, 4 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 269 (1974),
citing Rolin-Jacquemyns, Note Sur la Theorie du Droit d'Intervention, 8 REV. DE DROIT ET
DE LEG. COMP. 675, 679 (1876).
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mediacy of violation of human rights; the extent of the violation;
the presence or absence of an invitation to use forcible self-help;
the degree of coercive measures employed; and the relative disin-
terest of the acting state."' All of these factors bear upon assess-
ments of the legitimacy of the motivation behind particular cases
of intervention, as the previously discussed examples of state
practice have shown. A dilemma persists, however, as the in-
tervening state is at the critical time both the actor and the sole
judge in its own cause. Such a criticism may appear simplistic,
when one considers that the need for a doctrine of humanitarian
intervention emanates from the exigencies of a world-view still
dominated by individual state actors.'58 Yet it is still a dilemma for
which no satisfactory answer has been found.
Detractors from the doctrine are inclined to say that the lesson
to be learned from the practice of states invoking the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention speaks for itself,"9 and that advocacy of
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention simply flies in the face
of the accepted consensus of the international community."w
However, such arguments are unsatisfactory because they do not
fully meet the moral argument for humanitarian intervention.
Thus, they frequently fall prey to the criticism that they offer no
more than "an arid textualist approach" ' to existing international
law, without appreciating the need to adapt the law-if necessary
by fashioning exceptions to rules-in order to respond to the
perceived and strongly felt needs of the international community.
,' See Lillich, supra note 7, at 347-51; for a similar analysis see Nanda, The United
States' Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order, 43 DENVER L.J. 439,
475 (1966); de Schutter, Humanitarian Intervention: A United Nations Task?, 3 CALIF.
W. INT'L L.J. 21, 29-30 (1973); Farer, The View from Charlottesville, supra note 79, at
150-52.
' The "great illusion of our times," according to Raymond Aron, is "the illusion that
economic and technological interdependence among the various factions of humanity has
definitely devalued the fact of 'political sovereignties,' the existence of distinct states which
wish to be autonomous." PEACE AND WAR 748 (1966). The dichotomy between the interna-
tional system of nation-states, and the relationships between individuals in a transnational
society proves otherwise. Id. at 104-05.
' Franck and Rodley, supra note 8. A recent example would seem to be Vietnam's inva-
sion of Cambodia.
" Professor Brownlie offers the view that North American scholarship largely in sup-
port of a (limited) doctrine of humanitarian intervention "is characterized by an isolation
which is remarkable. A vast international literature .. .is virtually ignored. A spirit of in-
ternationalism, a professional survey of the mature sources of world literature since 1945,
is not in evidence." Brownlie, Some Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in R. LILLICH,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 144.
"' Claydon, Humanitarian Intervention in International Law, 1 QUEEN'S INTRAMURAL
L.J. 36, 57 (1969).
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
Empirical conclusions on the self-serving practice of states, no
matter how devastating, fail to effectively counter this kind of
reasoning. But a competitive moral point of view underscored by
the lessons of past experience offers a more persuasive rebuttal to
the interventionist approach. Moreover, such a view can and
should be entertained.
Opposed to the case for humanitarian intervention stands a
basic rule of international law which, beyond the right of self-
defense or a collective response of the international community,
admits of no exception. This rule is at once a policy governing the
international legal order and, more basically, an embodiment of
the principle that the use of force is no longer a general right of
states professing membership in the community of nations. The
principle contained in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the
United Nations thus represents more than an international con-
sensus binding state actors; it is essentially a higher law among
nations viewed as fundamental to the survival not only of national
entities but of mankind in its entirety. In this context it has been
accorded the status of jus cogens,"' a "pre-emptory" norm of inter-
national law from which no derogation is permitted.'3
A rule of law has been clearly delineated which, at the same
time, must be viewed as a statement of fundamental values. "The
irreducible value, though not the exclusive one," to quote Alex-
ander Bickel, "is the idea of law."'64 Thus, in contradistinction to
opinions in support of humanitarian intervention, the normative
force of this prohibitive rule"6 5 has been enhanced through the pro-
cess of its gradual acceptance by the community of nations.
It may be considered trite to reiterate the old adage that hard
662 See Verdoss, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 A.J.I.L. 55,
60 (1966); Schwelb, Some Aspects of Jus Cogens as Formulated by the International Law
Commission, 61 A.J.I.L. 946, 952 (1967); MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 214-15 (1960);
BROWNLIE. PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 500 (2d ed. 1973).
The concept of jus cogens was developed pre-eminently in the context of the work of
the International Law Commission on the law of treaties. See Report of the Commission to
the General Assembly on the work of its Eighteenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/6309 Rev. 1, Pt.
II, (1966) YRBK. OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, Vol. II, at 247; see Verdross and
Schwelb, supra note 162; Onuf and Birney, Pre-emptory Norms in International Law: Their
Source, Function and Future, 4 DENVER J. INT'L LAW & POL. 187 (1974). The existence of jus
cogens as an accepted concept in international law has been accorded recognition in Arti-
cle 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. For the text of the Convention
seeU.N, Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 23 May 1969; 63 A.J.I.L. 875 (1969); 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
6 A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 5 (1975).
166 "Law is more than just another opinion; not because it embodies all right values, or
because the values it does embody tend from time to time to reflect those of a majority or
plurality, but because it is the value of values. Law is the principal institution through
which a society can assert its values." Id.
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cases make bad law, yet contemporary invocations of the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention appear to treat this dictum with
somewhat less respect than it deserves. This criticism does not
seek to cast aside the dilemma created by the hard cases; these
situations must be faced squarely. Hence, there appears to be no
way to reconcile the rare category of case exemplified by the
Entebbe incident. But Entebbe remains a discrete event that has
on its facts managed to withstand the test of much, if not all, world
opinion. It offers no solid justification, legally or morally, for an in-
dependent legal doctrine which, by its very nature, would not be
constrained by the apparent validity of such a precedent. At most,
the rare case justifies itself and no more: even then, the claim is
tenuous.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The case for humanitarian intervention is essentially mis-
directed. A history of black intentions clothed in white has tainted
most possible applications of the doctrine. Even where intentions
have been good, the use of force for humanitarian ends more often
than not has become self-defeating, increasing the human misery
and loss of life it was intended originally to relieve. Proponents of
humanitarian intervention would do well to consider more carefully
the predictably tragic consequences of this unfortunate paradox.
Humanitarian considerations cannot be severed logically or
practically from the political act of a military deployment of the
forces of one state in the sovereign territory of another. Most
human rights deprivations constitute particularly cruel examples
of political gamesmanship in the eternal struggle for power within
and between states; but the concept of humanitarian intervention
is little more than an exasperated recourse to the same power
struggle. Different rules are called for. Since the struggle is ongo-
ing, the conduct of the offender must change if abuses are to be ef-
fectively countered. Processes for influencing even the most
odious international delinquents should, if at all possible, avoid
legitimating the employment of actions in kind. None of these bring
the immediate satisfactions of an apparently successful external
act of aggression in the cause of humanity. But, apart from its
rarity, that order of satisfaction becomes illusory when measured
as a response to the evil it seeks to eliminate and human life is fur-
ther cheapened in the result. Is there then sufficient grounds in
fact or law for according this doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion the status of law among nations? One would hope that the
answer is clear enough.

